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JURISDICTION
Appellant's statement of jurisdiction is correct
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE FOR REVIEW
Does

Utah

Code

Ann.

§62A-4a-413

require

a

factual

determination that a convicted felon provides one of five specified
child

care

services

before

employment

at

the

facility

is

prohibited?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant's statement of the applicable standard of review is

correct.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. §62A-4a-413 (Supp. 2000).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As a "youth program", Sorenson's Ranch School ("Sorensons") is
subject to the licensing requirements of UCA §62A-4a-413.

Section

413 is designed to require criminal background screening of all
persons

associated

with

youth programs, and then

to determine

whether convicted felons (and misdemeanants) provide any of the
specified services for children in the facility.

Section 413(2)

prohibits felons from providing any child care services to children
in the facility.
Shaun Sorenson is employed by Sorenson's and has a felony
record for DUI with accident/injury.
the

criminal

background

screening

This record was revealed by
conducted

by the Office

of

Licensing pursuant to Section 413.However, Licensing has refused to
perform

the second

step of determining

whether

Shaun

Sorenson

provided any of the services for children listed in Section 413
before requiring his termination.

Instead, Licensing proceeded

under the interpretation that they are not required to make that
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determination

or

provide

hearings

associated with youth programs.
district

court

which

to

any

convicted

felons

The Plaintiffs appealed to the

granted

summary

judgment

in

favor

of

Plaintiffs on grounds that Shaun Sorenson provided none of the
prohibited

services

and

therefore

his

employment

need

not be

terminated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sorenson's
youth. (R. 1-6)

is a residential treatment program for troubled
It is also part of a larger corporation involved in

other kinds of business endeavors. Burnell Sorenson is the founder
and owner of Sorenson1s and the Defendant Shaun Sorenson is his
son.

In 1992, Shaun Sorenson was convicted of two felonies in the

state of California for DUI with accident/injury and hit and run
from

the

same

incident.

(R.

1-6,10-11)

Subsequently,

Shaun

Sorenson moved back to Utah to work for the family business. (R. 16)

A plumber by trade, he performs maintenance and construction

work. (R. 66-67) He provides no counseling, teaching or supervision
of

the

students

at

Sorenson's.

(R.

66-67)

Most

recently

he

constructed homes in a new subdivision, (R. 66-67)
Pursuant

to

the

laws

governing

the

licensing

of

youth

programs, Sorenson''s listed Shaun Sorenson as an employee of the
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school. (R. 1-6) A criminal background screening conducted by the
Office of Licensing produced the felony convictions and the State
issued a Notice of Agency Action on January 30, 1998. (R. 10-11)
The Notice required either the termination
employment

of Shaun Sorenson's

or revocation of Sorenson's license.

Plaintiffs

requested

a

determination

that

prohibited

Section

by

Shaun

hearing
Sorenson

413(2).

to

(R. 10-11) The

challenge

actually

(R. 13-16)

the

provided
Pursuant

State's
services

to

agency

policy, the Office of Licensing then filed a Motion to Dismiss
Hearing Request on the basis that there were no disputed issues of
fact due to its interpretation of the statute that all felons are
prohibited from any association with youth programs. R. 12)
February 18, 1998, an Order Dismissing Defendant's

On

Hearing Request

was issued by an officer of the Office of Administrative Hearings
"because the Defendant was convicted of an offense which prevents
him from being employed in a licensed facili-ty." (R. 13-16) The
Plaintiffs filed a Request for Reconsideration on the grounds that
there had never been a finding and adjudication that Shaun Sorenson
provided any of the services prohibited by Section 413(2). (R. 1719)

On March 18, 1998, the hearing officer reversed her prior

decision

and

issued

an Order Granting

4

Defendant's

Request

for

Reconsideration concluding that there was an issue of fact whether
Shaun Sorenson was an employee "who provides services or care to
children." (R. 17-19)
Despite this order, a second hearing officer requested briefs
from

the

parties

then

denied

the

Plaintiffs'

request

for

an

evidentiary hearing by concluding that no felons could be employed
by Sorenson's in any capacity. (R.7-9)

The Plaintiffs appealed to

the district court seeking de novo review of the agency action. (R.
1-6)

The State filed a motion requesting summary judgment on the

grounds that as a convicted felon, Shaun Sorenson could not be
employed at Sorenson's "in any capacity." (R. 35-48) The Plaintiffs
objected and filed a cross-motion

for summary judgment on the

grounds that Shaun Sorenson's employment was prohibited only if he
provided one of the services listed in Section 413(2). (R. 49-65)
The district

court

denied

the State's motion

and granted

the

Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 85-87)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As conceded by the State in its brief, this appeal involves
the

interpretation

inconsistent.

of a statute

that

By its own designation,

is neither

ambiguous

or

Section 62A-4a-413 governs

the licensing of "[a]gencies and individuals providing services to
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children." (See title to UCA §62A-4a-413.)

It requires a two-part

screening test for such agencies and individuals to identify and
prohibit convicted criminals from providing the specified services
to children.
The first part of the screening, found in Section 413(1), is
used to identify any persons associated with the agency.

It is a

broad and expansive test listing six (6) different associations an
individual may have with the agency.

Any person having one of

these associations with the agency must be disclosed to the Office
of Licensing for a criminal background check.
criminal history

is subject to the second

Any person with a

screening

test. The

second part, found in Section 413(2) for felonies and 413(3) for
misdemeanors, requires the State to determine whether a convicted
person provides any of five (5) enumerated services for children in
the

facility.

If

the

person

provides

such

services,

their

employment must be terminated.
In an attempt to streamline and simplify their legislative
mandate, the State Office of Licensing has eliminated the second
part of the screening procedure.

The reason is that it is easier

to prohibit all felons from any contact with child care agencies.
But in doing so, the State has violated important employment rights

6

and compromised the integrity of the licensing system established
by the Legislature. In the name of protecting children, the State
argues for its interpretation.

As shown below, the State's policy

does nothing to improve upon a comprehensive screening procedure
which

is

effective

if

administered

properly

in

the

manner

envisioned by the Legislature.
ARGUMENT
I.
SECTION 62A-4a-413 REQUIRES A FACTUAL DETERMINATION THAT A
FELON PROVIDES CHILD CARE SERVICES BEFORE EMPLOYMENT IS PROHIBITED

Chapter 4a of Title 62A governs child and family services.
Private
required

agencies
to

guidelines.

be

and

individuals

licensed

by

the

providing
state

and

such
to

services
follow

are

strict

One of those requirements concerns reporting the names

of all persons associated with the facility . Pursuant to UCA §
62A-4a-413 (1),

licensed

facilities

must

submit

the

names

and

identifying information for each and every individual employed by
or associated with the facility in one of six different capacities:
(1) (a) As of July 1, 1990, each public or private agency
or individual licensed by the department to provide child
placing services, youth programs, substitute, foster or
institutionalized care to children shall, in order to
obtain or renew a license under Section 62A-2-108, submit
to the department the name and other identifying
information, which may include fingerprints, of new and
proposed:
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i. owners;
ii. directors;
iii.members of the governing body;
iv. employees;
v. providers of care;
vi. volunteers, except parents of children enrolled in
the programs.

Utah Code Ann. §62A-4a-413(1)(a).
There are no exceptions to this reporting requirement.
single

person

capacities

associated

must

be

with

disclosed

criminal background checks.
first

test, and

requirement.

it

is

the
to

facility

the

state

in
for

one

of

Every
these

screening

and

This is the first requirement or the

separate

and distinct

from

any

other

The purpose of Subsection (1) is to report and screen

all persons associated with the facility. Thus, it is a screening
requirement

The child care agency discloses all persons who meet

one of the six (6) classifications of persons associated with the
facility.

Only

if

they

can

be

classified

in

one

of

these

capacities and have a criminal history, do we proceed to the second
test contained in Subsection

(2) .

The fact that a facility is

required to report all persons with criminal histories who are
associated with the program does not automatically translate into
a

prohibition

against

employment.

Subsection

(1)

is

only

a

reporting requirement to determine the type of association and
8

criminal history of persons associated with a licensed facility.
It contains no prohibitory language.
Instead, Subsection (2) of 413 provides the actual regulation
of employment in licensed facilities.

It states:

(2) An owner, director, member of the governing body,
employee, provider of care or volunteer who has a felony
conviction may not provide child placing services, foster
care,
youth
programs,
substitute
care
or
institutionalized care for children in facilities or
programs licensed by the department.
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-413(2).
of

Licensing

to

determine

Subsection 2 requires the Office

whether

any

person

identified

in

Subsection 1 as a convicted felon actually provides one of the
child care services at the facility before any action is taken.
This is the second test or "services" test.
is that

they may not provide

The strict prohibition

one of the five

(5) enumerated

services which are: child placing services, foster care, youth
programs

or substitute

or institutional

care.

Licensing must

investigate and determine whether the convicted person actually
provides any of those services. This is also consistent with the
policy and purpose of the statute.

The statute does not prohibit

all contact, association or employment.

The plain language of

Subsection 2 is dispositive on this issue. It uses the express
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language "may not provide" and lists five kinds of services, then
limits the services to those being provided
programs

licensed

by

the

department."

"in facilities or

There

can

be

a

vast

difference between an employee providing child care services in the
facility and other types of employees.
For example, a part-time custodian is employed by a day-care
to mow the lawn and clean the building on weekends.

The custodian

was convicted of poaching a goose fifteen years ago.

This is a

felony under federal law and Section 413 provides no distinction
between the types of felonies. The facility would be denied a
license or the custodian would be denied employment because of this
fifteen year old felony which is expungable only by presidential
pardon.

Another example, a boy's ranch raises alfalfa hay as part

of its program and hires a longhaul trucker to ship the baled hay
throughout the year.

The ranch?s license could be revoked because

the truck driver, whose only contact with the ranch is loading his
truck, was convicted of graffiti-vandalism five years ago. That is
a third degree felony and under the interpretation proposed by the
State, there is no exception despite the fact that neither person
may

ever

speak

to a child

services to the children.

at

the

facility

let

alone

provide

The statute provides for a determination

10

whether

individuals

providing

services

eliminate

this

with
to

step

criminal

children.
of

the

convictions

The

statutory

State

are

is

actually

attempting

procedure

in

order

to
to

streamline and simplify its own procedures at the expense of the
associations

and

of

the

employment

of

others

who

provide

no

services to children.
The absurdity of the State's interpretation is illustrated by
the

instant

case.

Consider

the

following

scenarios.

Sorenson has moved back to Utah to work for his father.

Shaun
He will

build houses to sell but will also provide plumbing and maintenance
services to the School.

Under the State's interpretation, Shaun

would be prohibited from providing any services of any kind to the
School

If he received a pay-check and was considered an employee,

then his employment in any capacity would be prohibited.

Moreover,

his father would risk revocation of his license to operate if he
paid Shaun a dime for work at the School

It gets worse.

What if Shaun had decided to stay in California and work as a
plumber but, because of advancing age, his father makes Shaun and
his other children shareholders in the family corporation which
includes Sorenson's Ranch School.

Section 413 requires that all

"owners, directors or members of the governing board" be disclosed
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to the State for criminal background checks.
interpretation,

Shaun

could

not

hold

a

Under the State's
corporate

office,

directorship or even own a single share in the business his father
and family have built.

And this restriction is not temporary.

As

a felon not entitled to expungement under California law, Shaun
could never own or be involved with his family business for the
rest of his life short of a governor's pardon which is all but
impossible.
It is simply inconceivable that the State Legislature intended
such a result.

The second part of the screening procedure in

Section 413 would easily prevent such an absurd result.

This is

the

413

reason

that

the

prohibitive

contained in subsections
convicted

criminals

language

(2) and (3).

from providing

of

Section

is

It specifically prohibits

child

care

services

in the

facility or program. It is not a blanket prohibition restricting
all employment and association of any kind.

II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS ILLUSTRATE THE INTENT OF SECTION
413
The Legislature's

intent to limit the prohibition to only

those persons providing child care services can be seen in a recent
amendment to Section 413.

Subsection 3 of Section 413 governs

misdemeanor convictions which are, as opposed to felonies, within
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the discretion of the department to allow convicted misdemeanants
to provide child services.

The current version of Subsection 3

reads as follows:
With regard to an owner, director, member of the
governing body, employee, or provider of care who has a
misdemeanor conviction, the executive director has
discretion to determine whether or not that person may
provide any child placing, foster care, youth programs,
substitute care, or institutionalized care for children
in a facility or program licensed by the department.
Utah Code Ann. §62A-4a-413 (3) .
intentionally

inserted

the

As shown below, the Legislature

word

"provide"

which

is

the

same

language as Subsection 2. More importantly, the Legislature removed
more specific language prohibiting all "employment" of convicted
criminals.

The earlier version of Subsection 3 read as follows:

With regard to an employee or provider of care who has a
misdemeanor conviction, the executive director has the
discretion to determine whether or not that person may be
employed by any child care, child placing, foster care,
substitute care, or institutionalized care for children
in a facility or program licensed by the department.
Utah Code Ann. §62A-4-514 (1991 Supp.).
The Legislature intentionally deleted the phrase "be employed
by" and substituted the word "provide."
obvious:

instead

of

this

prohibition

The plain meaning is

applying

to

all

persons

"employed by" the licensed facility, the Legislature modified the
language to apply to and prohibit only those individuals providing
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services to children.

Why would the Legislature make such an

explicit and detailed change if this was not their intent?

More

importantly, why did the Legislature amend Subsection 3 to make it
consistent with Subsection 2 if the intent was not the same: to
limit the prohibition to those persons providing services?

If the

intent were to prohibit all employment or association, it would be
expected

that

the

Legislature

would

have

made

the

reverse

modification so that Subsection 2 was consistent with Subsection 3
and prohibit all "employment" without exception.

Instead, the

Legislature mandated that the agency make a second determination.
Not only must the convicted person be an employee (status test) but
they must also be an employee who provides child care services
(services test) . The state agency simply does not want the burden
of performing the second test as required by statute.

They do not

have the power or authority to disregard and ignore a statutory
mandate.
If the Legislature had intended licensed facilities to have no
employees or associations with convicted felons, it could have
easily written a statute explicitly prohibiting such contact. More
importantly, if that had been the Legislature's

intent, it would

not have eliminated language with that precise effect, "employed
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by", and substitute, less restrictive language, "provide" services.
To prohibit all employment, associations and contact on the basis
of

any

felony

unreasonable.

conviction

is

too

broad,

over-inclusive

and

In fact, under the State's interpretation, it would

be easier for Shaun Sorenson to get a job at a public school, see
UCA §53A-6-101 et. seq., or in a pediatric hospital, see UCA §2621-1 et. seq.

The State contends that every employee provides a

benefit to the children and on that basis alone, they should be
prohibited.

But the statute requires that they provide one of five

enumerated child care services, not just a benefit.

The State also

attempts to actually change the standard to any persons who may
ever have access to the children.

There is no support whatsoever

for this interpretation of the statute.

In fact, the StateTs

argument actually frustrates the intent of the Legislature.
Metaphorically, Section 413 was meant to enlarge the net but
sort out the fish.
this goal.

If applied correctly, the statute accomplishes

For example, Section 413(1) requires that all persons

associated with the licensed facility in the listed capacities be
disclosed.

This is the "net" capturing any person associated with

the facility who may have a criminal conviction.

Subsection (2)

then sorts or identifies those persons with criminal histories who
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actually provide one of the enumerated services to children.

It is

those persons who are prohibited from having any association with
the licensed facility.

The State's argument is based on an alleged

distinction between the terms "employee" and "provider of care".
The State contends that the use of both terms has some significance
other than the enlargement of the screening pool as shown above.
Both terms were necessary because some employees provide services
to the children in the youth program but are not "providers of
care."

Including both terms ensures that all persons are screened.

It does not obviate the need to perform the "services" test.

III. AN UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTE REQUIRES STRICT
POLICY MANIPULATION.

INTERPRETATION NOT

Statutes cannot be applied and administered at the whim and
fancy of each governmental agency.

For this reason, there are very

explicit rules of statutory construction which are followed by the
courts

when

interpreting

statutes.

The

Utah

Supreme

explained these rules as follows:
When faced with the question of statutory construction,
we look first to the plain language of the statute . .
we assume that each term in the statute was used
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally,
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or
inoperable. Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's
plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative

16

Court

history or relevant policy considerations.
Stevens

v.

Bonneville

Travel,

(1997) (Citations omitted).

Inc.,

935

P.2d

518,

520

The State's argument violates these

principles of statutory interpretation.

The State argues that

policy considerations should be used to interpret an unambiguous
statute and thereby change its plain meaning.
The

statute

is

clear,

concise

and

This is improper.

unambiguous.

The

State

speculates that liabilities will be increased and criminals will
have

more

access

to

children

without

interpretation advanced by the State.

the

strict

and

narrow

However, neither of these

propositions are true if the Office of Licensing administers the
statute as written.
To

enhance

prevention

of child

abuse

and

close doors to

potential perpetrators, the Legislature enacted Section 413 to
require

disclosure

of

any

persons

associated

with

a

licensed

facility and criminal screens for all such individuals.

Because

this procedure is intentionally over-inclusive, the administering
agency was required by Subsection 2 to determine which of all the
individuals with criminal convictions actually provide services to
children and should be removed from the facility.

On a case-by-

case basis, more scrutiny and focus can be employed to review
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potential perpetrators of many different crimes acting in many
different capacities.

The large reporting net will also identify

sexual offenders who have failed to register with law enforcement
or who are prohibited

from contact with children by parole or

probation conditions. The reasoning and purpose of the statute are
sound.

The procedure and process are effective.

It is the State's

interpretation and implementation that are flawed.

The mindless

application of a statute can lead to the complete disruption of a
legislatively mandated procedure.
The policy manipulation by the State is illustrated by the
rules promulgated by the agency

itself. Prior to this action,

administrative rules for the Office of Licensing prohibited felons
from providing "services to children." In effect, the State had
interpreted Section 413 to prohibit felons from providing "services
to children" not prohibiting

all association

or employment. A

sample of the original administrative rules read as follows:

R-501-14-2 Definitions. "Employee" means a person who
works in, volunteers in a program to provide direct
services for children in a licensed provider facility.
R-501-14-4 Results of Screening.
(B) Denial: A person
convicted of a felony shall not be employed to provide
services for children.
Utah Admin. Code R-501-14-1, 501-14-2, and 501-14-4. Following the
18

filing of this action, the rules were modified to reflect current
State policies or political agendas.
R-501-14-2 Definitions. "Employee" means a person who
performs services for a licensee in a paid or otherwise
compensated capacity.
R-501-14-4 Results of Screening. (B) Denial: 1. A
licensee or a person associated with a licensee convicted
of a felony shall not be given a background screening
clearance required to provide services for the licensed
program serving children.
These rules, which were the State agencyfs interpretation and
administration of the statute, are entirely consistent with the
enabling

legislation.

The same procedure and standard as the

statute are applied by the original rules.
and intent are clear and unambiguous.

The statutory language

Persons with felony records

may not provide services for children.

They can mow the lawn,

build a garage or fix cars in the shop but they cannot provide
actual services to the children.
the statutory mandate.

This is the standard.

That is

Any further interpretation is a perversion

of the law established by the Legislature.
IV. THE STATE MISINTERPRETS THE STATUTE AND THE TRIAL COURT RULING
WITH ITS "SUPERFLUOUS" ARGUMENT
Repeatedly the State claims that any interpretation other than
a blanket prohibition of employment of felons would render Section
413 meaningless and superfluous: "the requirement to check the
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criminal background of an employee becomes superfluous if only the
criminal background of a provider of care is pertinent."
statement

and

argument

are

the

result

of

a

This

fundamental

misunderstanding of the screening procedure set out in Section 413.
As explained herein, the first section cf 413 is a broad and
over-inclusive reporting requirement.

Obviously, it is important

to know the criminal histories of any person associated with child
care.

The

State

confuses

the

issue by

asking

why the

"employee" and "provider of care" are listed together.

terms

The reason

they are listed together, with four other categories, is to enlarge
the reporting and screening pool to any and all
associated with a child care agency.

persons who may be

It is not, as the State

contends, a redundant reporting requirement because both employees
and providers of care may provide child care services.
The flaw in the State's understanding and application is when
they

try

to

prohibited

reconcile

services

in

the

terms

413(2).

listed
Why,

in

the

413(1)

State

with

asks,

the

would

employees be listed in 413(1) with providers of care when only
persons

providing

services

employment in 413(2).

to

children

The answer is simple.

are

prohibited

from

In some cases there

will be employees, owners, directors, etc. who provide child care
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services

in addition

director, etc.

to their position

as employee, owner or

If only a "provider of care" was listed in 413 (1),

perhaps an owner or director may not view themselves as required to
disclose themselves and be subject to a criminal background check
because they are not a teacher, therapist, counselor, chaperon,
supervisor, nurse or other person who may be a "provider of care/'
The logical extension of the State's interpretation shows that
it is not reasonable or necessary.

If the State's interpretation

is upheld and a plumber such as Shaun Sorenson is forced to leave
the employ of Sorenson's, how can he be stopped from providing the
same

plumbing

and

maintenance

independent contractor.

services

to

the

school

as

an

The answer is that he cannot be prohibited

from providing such services because the screening statute, Section
413,

never

intended

to prohibit

his employment

employee or independent contractor.

whether

as an

As an independent contractor,

he would not fit any of the classifications listed in Section 413
(1) and therefore he would not be required to disclose himself to
the Office of Licensing for a criminal background check.

Also,

since he is an independent contractor, the School would not be
required

to

disclose

his

name

or

address.

The

State's

interpretation elevates form over substance to allow Shaun Sorenson
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to do indirectly what he cannot do directly.

It makes no sense and

the distinction serves no purpose.
More
obvious

importantly, does

loophole?

Section

Of course

413 really

create

such an

it doesn't because whether

Shaun

Sorenson provides maintenance services to the School as an employee
or

as

an

independent

contractor,

services in the facility.

he

provides

no

child

care

Under the proper administration

of

Section 413, the result is the same regardless of how and by whom
the plumbing is fixed at Sorenson's. On the other hand, Section 413
would prohibit an independent contractor from working directly with
the children as a teacher or counselor because that contractor
(just like some employees) is providing child care services.

The

title and very first sentence of Section 413 clearly impose the
same disclosure and screening requirements upon any individuals who
"provide" any of the child care services listed which would include
independent contractors.
The State has attempted to inflame the issue on appeal by
raising the specter of child molesters posing as janitors and
custodians. As shown above, an independent contractor can avoid all
screening requirements and still work within a facility or program
providing child care services. If the State's "potential access to
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children" is the standard, then we should start screening all
independent contractors who work for child care agencies

(e.g.

construction, plumbing, electrical, accounting, legal) as well as
the mailman, meter reader, delivery truck driver ad infinitum. Or,
we can simply apply the statute as written to those persons who
actually provide the child care services specifically listed and
enumerated by the Legislature.
CONCLUSION
Section

62A-4a-413

is

a

straight-forward

and

unambiguous

screening statute for the licensing of child care facilities.

It

is remarkably effective in screening all persons and prohibiting
criminals from providing child care services.

In a climate of

acute child protection, the Office of Licensing is attempting to
make the laws instead of administer them.

The State requests a

blanket prohibition of felons having any association or employment
of any kind with these agencies.
Legislature wrote it.

That is not the law as the

Felons like Shaun Sorenson are entitled to

a hearing and a determination whether they provide child care
services before their employment is prohibited.

The trial court

gave him that hearing and approved his employment.
should uphold and affirm that action.
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This Court

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

//

day of June, 2001
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